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Abstract
Scrutinising the 2016 Brexit Referendum, this paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the relationship
between corporate financial performance and CSR using a sample of 320 non-financial firms listed at the London Stock
Exchange. The sample covers the period of 2014 to 2018 with 2016 marking increased, and 2017 and 2018 representing
years of moderated policy uncertainty. Using cross-sectional regression analysis of shock-period buy-and-hold returns, this
paper finds (I) a statistically and economically significant inverse relationship between reservoirs of social capital previously
accrued through CSR initiatives and returns. The effect is driven by the Governance component of CSR, whereas the impact
of combined Environmental and Social pursues was not found to be meaningful. Using difference-in-difference methodology
with continuous treatment, this investigation concludes (II) high-CSR and low-CSR firms do not differ in terms of sensitivity
to adverse Brexit shock implications on operating performance, profitability, financial health, and firm value. Further, (III)
effects of CSR on aforementioned aspects of real performance were not found to vary alongside levels of policy uncertainty.
Keywords: Brexit referendum; CSR; ESG investing; policy uncertainty.
1. Introduction
In the title of his article from 1970, Milton Friedman fa-
mously claimed that “The Social Responsibility of Business
is to Increase Its Profits”. Almost 40 years after one of the
most influential neoclassical economists negated the funda-
mental question of whether firms should go beyond invest-
ing in activities with direct link to profit generation, corpora-
tions and investors draw a different picture: Over the last two
decades, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and environ-
mental, social and governance (ESG) initiatives1 have devel-
1Both concepts of CSR and ESG (used interchangeably in this paper) re-
fer to corporate activities beyond profit generation that include, amongst
others, “civic engagement, shared beliefs, and disposition towards coopera-
tion between the firm and its stakeholders” (Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017,
p. 1790). Thereby, firms go above and beyond legal requirements, which
might well be justified by strategic reasoning (Jo & Harjoto, 2012). The
acronym CSR has its roots in managerial literature based on Ansoff (1965)
and Freeman (1984) Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management. In
contrast, ESG is employed in the context of Socially Responsible Investing
(SRI). Hence, the concept of ESG might be understood as a form of measure-
ment of CSR (Bouslah, Kryzanowski, & M’Zali, 2013). Following authors
such as Bouslah et al. (2013); Bouslah, Kryzanowski, and M’Zali (2018); Di
Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014); Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008) this
paper proxies CSR using all three ESG dimensions.
oped into popular buzzwords in business literature (Rüegg-
Stürm, 2014). At the end of 2017, 12 trillion dollars were
invested in socially responsible assets in the USA alone (Fo-
rum, US Social Investment, 2018). Likewise, 78% of the
world’s largest 4,900 companies disclose information on gov-
ernance mechanisms and their social and environmental im-
pact (KPMG, 2017). The justification behind pursuits of so-
cially responsible activities are that they create a form of
intangible, alternative capital: the so-called social capital
comprising relational wealth among stakeholders. Impor-
tant component of this capital is increasing trustworthiness of
firms. Knack and Keefer (1997); Putnam (1993) argue this to
reduce transaction costs as stakeholders attribute lower un-
certainty about whether firms honour their contracts to firms
they trust.
Conversely, the last decade of expanding trust-building
initiatives to mitigate uncertainty among stakeholders was
accompanied by numerous political events inducing policy
uncertainty2 across markets affecting stock markets and real
performance (inter alia, Baker et al., 2016; Kelly, Pastor, &
2Policy uncertainty is defined by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) as un-
certainty about economic policy decisions. They identify four elements of
economic policy uncertainty: uncertainty regarding the (1) identity of deci-
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Veronesi, 2016; Pastor & Veronesi, 2012; Voth, 2002).
The coinciding trends raise the question as to whether
firms can actively instrumentalise trust-building CSR initia-
tives to mitigate adverse effects of uncertainty on corporate
financial performance. To the best knowledge of the author,
no previous investigation was conducted to scrutinise the ef-
fects previously accumulated social capital has on corporate
financial performance during times of increased policy un-
certainty. Instead, literature has treated the relationship be-
tween financial performance and CSR, and financial perfor-
mance and policy uncertainty as individual research streams.
As for CSR and firm performance, literature is abundant
and has focused on establishing causality and directionality
of effects of CSR on different aspects of corporate financial
performance. Authors such as Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin
(2006); Jo and Na (2012); Kim, Li, and Li (2014) focus on
stock returns and idiosyncratic market risk. Bird, D. Hall, Mo-
mentè, and Reggiani (2007); Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, and
Koedijk (2011); Jiao (2010); Jo and Harjoto (2011) inves-
tigate operating performance and firm value. Also access to
finance was addressed in literature (Cheng, Ioannou, & Ser-
afeim, 2014; Cui, Jo, & Na, 2018; Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim,
2017; Harjoto & Jo, 2015). Two opposing schools of thought
have emerged explaining the relationship: the stakeholder
view of the firm that promotes positive effects through repu-
tation building (e.g. Jo & Harjoto, 2012; Makni, Francoeur,
& Bellavance, 2009), and the shareholder view of the firm ar-
guing in favour of Friedman based on overinvestment costs
(e.g. Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Cespa & Cestone, 2007). The
relative justification of one theory over the other has received
much attention, but no consensus was reached so far.
As for policy uncertainty, stock market reactions to elec-
tions (Kelly et al., 2016; Li & Born, 2006; Pantzalis, Stange-
land, & Turtle, 2000) and to Baker et al. (2016) economic
policy uncertainty index were analysed. Further, studies by
N. H. Nguyen and Phan (2017); Phan, Nguyen, Nguyen, and
Hegde (2019); Xu, Chen, Xu, and Chan (2016) also investi-
gate firm behaviour. But little research addresses differences
in sensitivity to uncertainty in the cross-section of firms (Hill,
Korczak, & Korczak, 2019).
More recent shock-based papers on CSR provide con-
text for a link between policy uncertainty and CSR’s effects
on firms: Bouslah et al. (2018); Buchanan, Cao, and Chen
(2018); Lins et al. (2017), focusing on the 2008 financial
crisis, indicate the two opposing theories on CSR describe
effects that exist relative to each other. Overall dominance
of one effect over the other is influenced by macro-level
conditions, with dominance being more pronounced under
adverse conditions.
sion makers, the (2) nature and (3) timing of policy actions, and economic
ramifications of “noneconomic” policy matters such as military actions.
Baker et al. (2016) policy uncertainty index has established as a generally
accepted measure in financial research (see, inter alia, Fernández-Villaverde,
Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015); N. H. Nguyen and
Phan (2017); Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013)). Thus, Baker et al. (2016)
definition is followed in this paper.
One of the most recent and prominent – since still per-
sisting – source of uncertainty is the European Union Mem-
bership Referendum (Brexit Referendum) that took place on
23rd June 2016. The Referendum has proven that policy un-
certainty is a likewise source for adverse macro conditions.
The vote of UK citizens to leave the European Union (EU)
has led policyrelated uncertainty in the UK soar to unprece-
dented heights. At the same time, the UK’s economy is con-
fronted with unforeseeable consequences. The exit from the
EU planned for October 2019 will overhaul the overall legal
framework within which companies interact in the UK and
across UK borders (Edgington, 2019; Hill et al., 2019).
This paper advances both research streams on CSR and
policy uncertainty by unifying them to analyse the impact of
policy uncertainty on the relationship between CSR and cor-
porate financial performance. As both research streams are
prone to the endogeneity problem (Harjoto & Jo, 2015; Julio
& Yook, 2012; Ullman, 1985), we apply a shock-based causal
inference methodology. Thereby, the Brexit Referendum pro-
vides the natural experiment to close the identified research
gap, using a sample of 320 non-financial firms listed at the
London Stock Exchange over the period of 2014 to 2018. We
further progress literature by disentangeling contributions of
overall CSR by analysing effects of the combined Environ-
mental and Social, as well as the Governance pillar of CSR. A
third contribution is to compare evaluations of CSR by invest-
ing stakeholders (by analysing buy-and-hold returns in an
event study) with evaluations by non-investing stakeholders
(by analysing operation performance, financial health, and
firm value using difference-in-difference analysis).
The following conclusions have been drawn. CSR invest-
ments, especially Governance related pursues, can destroy
shareholder wealth during policy uncertainty. However, from
the view of non-investing stakeholders, no effects on real per-
formance are evident – for none of the analysed aspect of
CSR. Further, the latter relationship does not vary across dif-
ferent levels of policy uncertainty. The findings are robust
across a series of robustness tests.
These findings have various implications for practition-
ers. For investors, they suggest avoiding high-CSR firms dur-
ing increased policy uncertainty, especially if they have es-
tablished Good Corporate Governance practices. From the
perspective of financial managers, we infer CSR investments
are not an effective means to limit exposure to policy uncer-
tainty shocks.
Our findings are also relevant for politics given that the
US Congress is debating on mandatory ESG disclosure regu-
lations (Harty, 2019), and given that von der Leyen, the new-
lyelected president of the EU Commission, addressed plans of
environmental taxes in her campaign speech (Stearns, 2019).
Negative effects on stock returns and neutral effects on real
performance suggest ESG dimensions are still areas in which
Government has to intervene for companies to meet legiti-
mate concerns of certain stakeholders.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the theoretical motivation behind the effect
of social capital on corporate firm performance and the link to
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policy uncertainty. Section 3 discusses the data analysed and
motivates the natural experiment employed for regression
analysis. Section 4 and 5 present and discuss results of base-
line and robustness tests. Section 6 discusses the paper’s find-
ings in context with previous shock-based inferences. Section
7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Social Capital and Corporate Financial Performance
The question of main interest in financial research on
CSR links back to Friedman’s article from 1970: Can compa-
nies’ socially responsible behaviour be brought in line with
investors’ interest of value maximisation? Two schools of
thought have developed in literature offering opposing an-
swers to this question: (I) the stakeholder, and (II) the share-
holder view of the firm.
The stakeholder view has its roots in Ansoff (1965) and
Freeman (1984) seminal works and suggests a positive rela-
tionship between CSR activities and corporate financial per-
formance. The argument supporting the positive effect is the
“reputation-building hypothesis” (Jo & Harjoto, 2012; Makni
et al., 2009). Its argument is that social, ethical, and envi-
ronmental as well as good corporate governance initiatives
build up a reputation among external parties in the form of
goodwill and trust in the company, i.e., create so-called so-
cial capital3 (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008; Sacconi & Degli An-
toni, 2011). More specifically, Luo and Bhattacharya (2009)
highlight the value of CSR to firms stems from the beliefs
stakeholders hold about the firm. If CSR activities and con-
veyed implications about the firm receive positive evaluation
from stakeholders, social capital is generated. Social capital,
in turn, is hypothesised to increase financial performance by
generating different forms of relational wealth among differ-
ent stakeholder groups (Godfrey, 2005).
For non-investing stakeholders, Lins et al. (2017) mainly
trace positive effects back to creating moral incentives for
stakeholders to honour their contract. Given the information
asymmetries between the parties and the fact that contracts
are on future transactions, stakeholders and companies al-
ways face the risk of the other party not honouring them.
From the stakeholders’ perspective, CSR activities are theo-
rised by Putnam (1993) to foster trust and cooperation and
to mitigate conflicts (Freeman, 1984). This argumentation is
supported by empirical evidence of a positive relationship be-
tween perceived trustworthiness of firms and stakeholder co-
operation (see, inter alia, Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2015;
3The concept of social capital itself stems from the field of sociology. In
this context, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, p. 333)
define it as “a propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce so-
cially efficient outcomes”. The concept was operationalised by economists
such as Coleman (1988) or Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008) to
be understood as a resource for profit-generating activities. In an OECD pa-
per, Scrivens and Smith (2013) decompose this resource into four pillars:
relationships, social network support, civic engagement, and trust. This def-
inition overlaps with the concept of CSR and ESG outlined in footnote 1. For
a detailed theoretic motivation of the concepts’ link, see Sacconi and Degli
Antoni (2011).
Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Knack and Keefer (1997) infer
stakeholders may perceive the breaching of contracts by the
firm as less likely, which reduces the need for formal con-
tracts and thus transaction costs. In this context, Sharfman
and Fernando (2008) and El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and
Mishra (2011) find evidence for high CSR reducing the cost
of equity capital and Goss and Roberts (2011) for reduced
default risk.
As for shareholders, Guiso et al. (2008) explain that
due to agency problems, the investment decision is not only
driven by accounting data, but also by an act of faith in the
reliability of disclosed information. Building on this, Lins et
al. (2017) also argue trust-based measures need to be con-
sidered. Therefore, social capital measures are requested to
provide additional information on the company’s integrity
and credibility, which leads to higher relative valuation in
cases of positive perception (Bouslah et al., 2013; Lee & Faff,
2009). In this sense, social capital can be understood as a
means of reducing information asymmetries, which is em-
pirically supported by Cui et al. (2018). Ghoul et al. (2017)
add the effect is especially pronounced in countries that lack
market-supporting institutions.
An opposing negative effect of CSR on corporate financial
performance is put forth by the second school of thought, the
shareholder view of the firm. This school does not dispute
positive effects of social capital’s relational wealth. Rather,
a managerial opportunism argument is derived from the
agency theory, the so-called “overinvestment hypothesis”.
This argument follows Friedman (1970) notion that costs of
CSR might outweigh the benefits. According to the agency
theory, shareholders have fewer insights on business opera-
tions than managers due to the separation of ownership and
control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In case of diverging inter-
ests, Buchanan et al. (2018) theorise managers can exploit
the incomplete contracts to pursue their interests and poten-
tially harm investors in their wealth maximisation. Scholars
supporting the shareholder view posit managers do have
an intrinsic interest in investing in CSR activities beyond
an optimal, shareholder-benefitting level; either to increase
their reputation as socially responsible managers (Barnea
& Rubin, 2010) or to reduce the probability of replacement
(Cespa & Cestone, 2007). Even though Eccles, Ioannou, and
Serafeim (2014) argue CSR can reduce agency problems
since managers are forced to apply a long-term focus and are
thus associated with more responsible decision-making, Sur-
roca and Tribó (2008) find empirical evidence for managers
exploiting CSR for opportunistic pursuits. Their findings
suggest entrenched managers employ CSR investments as
a defence strategy. In this sense, CSR investments might
diverge company resources and thus harm real performance.
Orlitzky (2013) posits overinvestments also have a negative
effect on stock returns. He suggests the created social capital
is not systematically correlated with financial fundamen-
tals of the firm. The results are unjustified excess market
valuations leading to excess market volatility.
An abundant stream of literature is devoted to proving
which theory holds in reality. Table 7 in the appendix pro-
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vides an examplary overview and hints at the conclusion that
literature is inconclusive. Waddock and Graves (1997) at-
tribute this to inconsistencies in conceptualising CSR as dif-
ferent studies focus on different components of CSR (see Ta-
ble 7). More severely, Ullman (1985) criticises that problems
of endogeneity and the omitted variable bias are another ex-
planation for inconsistencies, discrediting the validity of past
research.
The methodological issue raised by Ullman (1985) is at-
tempted to be overcome by more recent, shock-based stud-
ies which offer a different conclusion: In previous research
designs, the relationship is mostly understood to be time-
invariant. Buchanan et al. (2018, p. 76), however, propose
the two school of thoughts are less of two mutually exclusive
explanations of which one is theorised to be correct and the
other to be wrong. Rather, they have to be understood as
antagonising channels through which CSR takes effect and
which exist alongside each other. They suggest the relation-
ship is time-varying and the overall effect depends on which
mechanism is dominant during the time period in question.
Based on the stakeholder theory, Lins et al. (2017) derive
from the notion of reciprocity of social capital that in difficult
times, stakeholders are more likely to “do whatever it takes”
to support firms with high social capital. As examples, they
name employees working harder, and outside agencies being
more sympathetic and supportive. In contrast, Buchanan et
al. (2018) argue that under the shareholder theory, shocks
are expected to increase overinvestment effects.
As for idiosyncratic, firm-specific adverse legal events,
Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) find evidence for social
capital acting as an insurance policy. They find that after the
event, high CSR scores have a positive effect on two-day cu-
mulative abnormal returns. Similarly, Minor (2015) suggests
firms with high CSR investments can, on average, save $1
billion in firm value upon negative legal events. More recent
and more closely related papers focus on aggregated market
shocks. Lins et al. (2017) investigate three adverse events:
the 2008 financial crisis, the Enron, and the Worldcom scan-
dal. All three events led to a decrease in the aggregated level
of trust in companies in the US. For the first two events, they
find a positive relationship between CSR and stock returns;
for the first event they also find a positive relationship with
operational performance. They conclude that social capital
especially pays off in crises of trust. Two more studies anal-
yse the risk-mitigation effects over varying economic condi-
tions, both two focusing on the 2008 financial crisis. Bous-
lah et al. (2018) investigate the effect of social performance
on idiosyncratic risk. Their results suggest that the relation-
ship significantly depends on the macroeconomic condition,
with an effect of reducing volatility by 1.18% to 1.84% dur-
ing the crisis period. Buchanan et al. (2018) come to an op-
posing conclusion. Even though they observe a higher firm
value as measured by Tobin’s Q for CSR firms before the
crisis, the opposite holds for the crisis period. This might
seem contradictory given Lins et al. (2017) finding of a pos-
itive impact on short-term operating profitability. However,
Tobin’s Q is a more forward-looking market valuation than
accounting-based returns and profitability measures (Guen-
ster et al., 2011). Hence, the two findings might indicate
that even though firms with a high reservoir of social capi-
tal are assigned to a valuation premium and are less affected
in short-term profitability, the market does not perceive high
CSR firms to outperform in terms of future cash flows when
faced with a market downturn.
2.2. Corporate Financial Performance in Times of Policy Un-
certainty
Findings of Lins et al. (2017) and Buchanan et al. (2018)
indicate that the effect of social capital on corporate firm per-
formance is time-varying, depending on the market condi-
tion; in their case predominantly analysed around the 2008
financial crisis. Building on Guiso et al. (2008, p. 2557) ar-
gument that making business with firms is an act of faith in
the reliability of the firm’s information disclosure, Lins et al.
(2017, p. 1791) argue that the trust element of social capi-
tal should pay off more during economic turmoil. This paper
posits an increase in policy uncertainty is an event negatively
affecting firms that allows investigating whether previously
accrued social capital helps firms to weather difficult times.
In fact, the effects of policy uncertainty on firm performance
have been investigated extensively. And in fact, an abundant
research stream has emerged emphasising adverse effects on
financial markets and the real economy.
One well-established research stream is devoted to
analysing the impact of uncertaintybearing recurring elec-
tions, termed electoral uncertainty by Kelly et al. (2016).
Several studies focus on its impact on the aggregated stock
market to analyse the existence of risk premia for electoral
uncertainty. Abnormally high stock returns shortly before
elections were observed by Pantzalis et al. (2000) for na-
tional elections in 33 countries and by Li and Born (2006) for
US presidential elections. Together with Gao and Qi (2013)
finding of rising municipal bond yields accompanying US gu-
bernatorial elections, these findings are indicative of an exist-
ing risk premium, even though Białkowski, Gottschalk, and
Wisniewski (2008) could not support this across 27 markets.
In a similar vein, stock market volatility around elections
was analysed. Findings by Kelly et al. (2016) across 271 in-
ternational elections and G20 summits, by Gemmill (1992)
for the 1987 British parliamentary election, and by Goodell
and Vähämaa (2013) for US presidential elections suggest
an increase in implied volatility. Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev,
and Molchanov (2012) offer more granularity: industries
which are more sensitive to politics experience higher return
volatility. In contrast to these aggregated effects, Julio and
Yook (2012) and Jens (2017) study real effects of electoral
uncertainty. Both studies suggest that firms reduce invest-
ments before US national and gubernatorial elections.
N. H. Nguyen and Phan (2017) and Pastor and Veronesi
(2012) indicate these studies only capture part of policy un-
certainty – a broader concept than electoral uncertainty. Fol-
lowing the definition of Baker et al. (2016), the first con-
cept also refers to policy changes affecting the macroeco-
nomic setting such as trade agreements and tax legislation, as
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well as economic impacts of non-economic political events.
This broader concept has been analysed regarding macroeco-
nomic effects by Baker et al. (2016) and Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2015). Both reason negative impacts on overall eco-
nomic conditions. This was for instance, illustrated by Stan-
dard & Poor’s first-ever downgrading of US Treasury bonds
due to policy uncertainty (Kelly et al., 2016). Similarly, Stock
and Watson (2012) indicate policy uncertainty negatively af-
fected recovery after the financial crisis. This notion is fur-
ther supported by Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) linking pol-
icy uncertainty to reductions in household consumption and
savings increases. As for influences on aggregated stock mar-
kets, academic literature follows studies on electoral uncer-
tainty investigating a potential risk premium for political un-
certainty measured by Baker et al. (2016) index or the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide (see, inter alia, Erb, Harvey,
& Viskanta, 1996). This notion is supported by Voth (2002)
finding of increased stock volatility. Another researched as-
pect is company behaviour. According to Gulen and Ion
(2016), companies become more selective; especially firms
with higher degrees of investment irreversibility and higher
financial constraints. This is further supported by Bloom,
Bond, and van Reenen (2007) and Jens (2017). Another
set of studies is dedicated to real effects on corporate finan-
cial performance. In terms of profitability, Belo, Gala, and
Li (2013) establish that cash flows vary over political cycles
in the US. This is in line with Cremers and Yan (2016) sug-
gestion of uncertainty increasing cash flow volatility and ul-
timately default risk. Similarly, An, Chen, Luo, and Zhang
(2016) observe that cash flow volatility caused by changes in
investment leads to reduced profitability as measured by re-
turn on assets in China. Together with Phan et al. (2019) and
Xu et al. (2016) linking uncertainty to reduced cash holdings,
one might infer increased risk of financial distress. Investiga-
tions of the cost of capital provide further support. Waisman,
Ye, and Zhu (2015) found bond spreads to increase through
uncertainty. Francis, Hasan, and Zhu (2014) support this in-
crease in debt financing costs by detecting an additional risk
premium for firms’ exposure to policy uncertainty priced in
bank loan spreads.
Despite the event’s topicality, some studies analyse the
Brexit Referendum’s impact on economy. Hill et al. (2019)
subsume the Brexit Referendum to be a shock to policy un-
certainty as it has consequences which are more far-reaching
than most parliamentary or presidential elections. As for
Brexit, the debate does not focus on selected policies but
rather affects the total of government policies that shape the
business environment. The vote thus leaves companies fac-
ing uncertainty about future operations in the UK. For in-
stance, international trading agreements, immigration poli-
cies and the overall legal framework primarly driven by EU
law are to be overhauled. Despite anticipated impact on cor-
porate decision making, Davies and Studnicka (2018) com-
ment most research addresses macroeconomic consequences.
Even though Minford, Gupta, Le, Mahambare, and Xu (2016)
expect positive impacts on the UK4, most studies suggest se-
vere negative effects such as a decline in foreign direct invest-
ment (see, inter alia, Dhingra, Ottaviaono, Sampson, & van
Reenen, 2016; Fraser of Allander Institute, 2016). Focusing
on the stock market, Davies and Studnicka (2018) detect sig-
nificant negative abnormal returns for FTSE350 companies,
especially for firms with global value chains. This is in line
with Boutchkova et al. (2012) but contradicts Beaulieu, Cos-
set, and Essaddam (2005). In contrast to the various stud-
ies on uncertainty on an aggregated level, several studies on
Brexit analyse how different firms and industries are affected.
Tielmann and Schiereck (2017), for instance, report a neg-
ative valuation effect for the logistic sector, while Ramiah,
Pham, and Moosa (2017) suggest the banking industry is es-
pecially strongly affected. The latter finding is supported by
Hill et al. (2019). They further find that internationalisation
moderates and greater firm size magnifies effects of Brexit
uncertainty. Further, growth firms, due to their dependence
on further investments, are especially hard-hit. However, to
the best knowledge of the author, no paper has investigated
the influence of CSR on the exposure to policy uncertainty.
2.3. CSR, Firm Performance, and Policy Uncertainty
The literature review on the relationship between CSR
and policy uncertainty respectively on corporate financial
performance reveals an overlapping research gap in both
streams of literature. As for policy uncertainty, aggregated
adverse effects on the stock markets, firm behaviour, and op-
erating performance are well documented. But even though
policy uncertainty has reached unprecedented hights (see
Figure 1), “we know surprisingly little about how this uncer-
tainty affects different firms and industries” (Hill et al., 2019,
p. 58). While the few recent studies on Brexit address this
gap by analysing individual sectors and different firm charac-
teristics such as internationalisation, to the best knowledge
of the author, no investigation focusing on whether accrued
social capital mitigates effects of uncertainty has been con-
ducted so far. This leads us to the corresponding gap in CSR
literature. Three papers have indicated that the overall ef-
fect of CSR depends on the relative, time-varying dominance
of the reputation-building benefits over the overinvestment
costs. The investigations establish the overall dominance is
influenced by aggregated macro-conditions. However, the
studies mainly focus on the 2008 financial crisis, with the
USA being the only market analysed. Hence, it still has to be
established whether findings also hold during other adverse
macro-events and in different markets.
In this sense, this paper scrutinises the 2016 Brexit Ref-
erendum to contribute to closing both research gaps. By
analysing how previously accrued social capital influences fi-
nancial performance of firms listed at the London Stock Ex-
change in the year of and the two years after the Referen-
dum (moderated policy uncertainty), this paper advances the
4Sampson, Dhingra, Ottaviaono, and van Reenen (2016) criticise under-
lying assumptions to be too optimistic.
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literature on CSR as well as on policy uncertainty. We fur-
ther combine several research streams by scrutinising both
stock market and real performance of firms. Real perfor-
mance is captured on the level of operating performance,
financial health, and firm value. This not only captures a
broad picture of financial performance but also differences
in how investing and non-investing stakeholders value CSR.
Following Buchanan et al. (2018); Lins, Volpin, and Wagner
(2013), we investigate CSR effects on corporate financial per-
formance during the shock and the recovery period to scruti-
nise whether effects are unique to times of high uncertainty.
In terms of stock market performance, literature on pol-
icy uncertainty indicates the existence of risk premia required
by investors (inter alia, Erb et al., 1996; Voth, 2002). Un-
derlying causes might be increased cash flow volatility and
default risk (An et al., 2016; Cremers & Yan, 2016). If the
stakeholder view holds, i.e. if CSR has positive effects on re-
turns, then shareholders’ positive valuation of integrity and
credibility should cause investors to be less pessimistic about
future firm performance. This, in turn, should lead to valua-
tion premia for high CSR firms (Godfrey, 2005; Guiso et al.,
2008; Lee & Faff, 2009). This leaves us with the following
first hypothesis:
H10 : Social capital is positively related to shock-
period stock returns.
In terms of real performance, the stakeholder view posits
that the relational wealth created among different stakehold-
ers – e.g. employee commitment, customer loyalty, credi-
bility among investors and lenders – acts as a reservoir of
goodwill. This is related to the notion of reciprocity sug-
gesting that during difficult times stakeholders which have
been accommodated in the past are willing to “do whatever it
takes” to support firms in need. This can relate back to differ-
ent levels of firm performance during policy uncertainty. In
terms of real performance, the stakeholder view posits that
the relational wealth created among different stakeholders
– e.g. employee commitment, customer loyality, credibility
among investors and lenders – acts as a reservoir of good-
will. In times of weakened economic conditions, customers
might, for instance, be more willing to “stick” with compa-
nies of which they hold higher beliefs and lenders could be
more complaisant (Lins et al., 2017). Further, previouslybuilt
trust could dampen increases of information asymmetries
in times of uncertainty (Cremers & Yan, 2016). Following
the stakeholder approach, these considerations might shield
firms from reduced profitability due to policy uncertainty (An
et al., 2016). These considerations leave us with the follow-
ing two hypotheses for operational performance (measured
by gross marging, sales growth, return on assets, and return
on equity), and financial health (measured as financial slack
and Altman’s Z):
H20 : Social capital is more positively related
to operating performance during policy uncer-
tainty.
H30 : Social capital is more positively related to
financial health during policy uncertainty.
We include financial slack due to Xu et al. (2016) and
Phan et al. (2019) findings of reduced cash holding and
higher costs of lending during policy uncertainty (Francis et
al., 2014). It can be interpreted as a cushion of cash firms
can use to weather economic downturns. This might be at-
tributable to Eccles et al. (2014) argument of managers of
high-ESG firms being more responsible.
Given the theorised positive effects that trust created
through CSR has on operating performance and financial
health, we anticipate the market to have more optimistic
views on cash flow volatility caused by policy uncertainty.
Eventually, this should positively impact firm value mea-
sured as Tobin’s Q:
H40 : Social capital is more positively related to
firm value during policy uncertainty.
A fith and last hypothesis to be tested addresses another
limitation of the shock-based CSR research designs. Table 7
indicates that different elements of CSR might be perceived
differently by various stakeholder groups. For instance, Har-
joto and Jo (2015) found that high overall CSR scores captur-
ing legal and normative aspects increase firm value, whereas
disaggregated high normative CSR scores are significantly
linked to reduced firm value. In contrast, Bird et al. (2007)
found a positive relationship on stock returns for employee-
related activities, but an inverse relationship for environmen-
tal activities. Hence, it might well be anticipated that the dif-
ferent pillars of CSR affect corporate financial performance
differently. CSR is disaggregated into two components: a
combined Environmental and Social (ES),5 and an individ-
ual Governance score.
H50 : Different components of CSR have different
effects on corporate financial performance.
In summary, this paper posits that in high-uncertainty
periods, trust- and cooperative-based relationships between
firms and stakeholders should pay off more than in more cer-
tain times. In this sense, we anticipate to find evidence in
favour of the stakeholder view of the firm.
3. Research Design
3.1. Empirical context
Buchanan et al. (2018) point out research on the rela-
tionship between corporate financial performance and CSR
faces to major challenges. The first is that the shareholder
and stakeholder view constitute two antagonising channels
for CSR effects with time-varying relative dominance. The
second challenge is the directionality of the relationship, i.e.
that CSR might not be endogenous to firm performance. For
5The rationale behind this is mainly based on the high correlation be-
tween the E and S scores. See section 4.1. for further explanation.
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instance, Waddock and Graves (1997) find effects in both
directions of influence and Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman
(2012) show increases in firms’ financial constraints, on av-
erage, have a negative influence on CSR involvement. Mo-
tivated by scholars such as Buchanan et al. (2018); Derrien
and Kecskés (2013); Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010); Lins
et al. (2017, 2013)6, these challenges are addressed by apply-
ing a shock-based study design. Following Lins et al. (2017),
this paper applies two shock-based investigations: For one,
uncertainty-period buy-and-hold shock-period returns are
analysed while difference-in-difference (DiD) methodology
is applied to investigate financial real performance. Contrary
to previous studies, a political shock, the Brexit Referendum
on 23rd July 2016, is analysed.
3.2. Brexit Referendum as a Policy Uncertainty Shock
The conclusion of the Referendum being an exogenous
shock was laid out by previous studies highlighting the mul-
tifaceted legal, macro-, and microeconomic effects of Brexit,
which are still unforseeable in the year of the UK’s perma-
nent exit from the EU. This notion is supported by Figure 1
plotting Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2019) Policy Uncertainty
Index. June 2016 marks the highest uncertainty level ever
recorded. Additionally, Brexit could not have been antici-
pated in advance as Brexit polls in the one-and-a-half years
leading to the vote (FIGURE 2) indicate neither the Leave
nor the Remain side had gained a persistent lead. Only in
the few months prior to 23rd of June, the Remain party had
gained a slight majority and even despite this, the opposite
outcome was achieved. Both notions hint at the event meet-
ing Atanasov and Black (2016, p. 216) requirement of an ex-
ogenous shock with permanent effect for shock-based causal
inference studies such as event studies and DiD.
The second peak of policy uncertainty in 2016 might raise
the concern that the Referendum might not have marked an
isolated shock, violating a second DiD credibility criterion by
Atanasov and Black (2016, p. 216). However, a look at the
Brexit timeline reveals the spike coincides with political re-
actions to the Referendum. For instance, the First Minister
of Scotland announced the intention to pass a Scottish inde-
pendence referendum bill on 13 October 2016 given that the
majority of Scots voted Remain (Walker, 2019).
A glance at current strategic decisions of corporations re-
veals a picture beyond estimated effects on macroeconomic
conditions and consequences of Brexit procedures on stock
markets as analysed in literature so far. Rather, it becomes
apparent that corporations increasingly adapt their strate-
gies to be prepared to deal with possible Brexit scenarios.
British Steel has announced 400 job cuts in September 2018
because of the weakened pound (Sommerlad & Chapman,
2019). Similarly, Barclays has moved £190bn of assets under
management to Ireland to avoid losing passporting rights al-
lowing to serve customers EU-wide, with HSBC, RBS, and
6All these studies investigate whether firms with different characteristics
(e.g. corporate governance or CSR practices) are affected differently by the
2008 financial crisis.
Lloyds following their lead (Crow, 2019). Turing to non-
financial industry, a 2019 survey by the Institute of Direc-
tors surveying 1,200 business leaders suggests that ca. 30%
of the surveyed either already have moved or are actively
considering moving operations outside the UK (BBC, 2019).
Given the various actions by firms to prepare for the worst-
case scenario of a no-deal Brexit, it can be assumed that the
shock is also sufficiently strong for DiD analysis (see Atanasov
& Black, 2016, p. 216).
In summary, overall evidence suggests the Brexit Referen-
dum to be a suitable event for shock-based causal inference
study.
3.3. Sample Construction
The sample construction is based on financial and CSR
data available on Thomson Reuter’s databases Datastream
and ASSET4, respectively. ASSET4 was introduced in 2002
and has been widely used in literature to investigate the ef-
fects of CSR on financial performance (see, inter alia, Cheng
et al., 2014; Ghoul et al., 2017). The database rates compa-
nies across environmental, social, and governance aspects7
on an annual basis. For the analysis of the individual pillars
of CSR, the aggregated Environmental and Social, and the
individual Governance scores provided by ASSET4 on Datas-
tream were used. For the aggregated CSR analysis, a compos-
ite CSR score was calculated as the equally-weighted average
of the E, S, and G scores (see, inter alia, Cheng et al., 2014).
ASSET4 comprises a worldwide universe of 7,975 histor-
ical constituents. Among those, 566 are public companies
listed in the UK. To investigate whether accumulating social
capital is beneficial for financial performance in uncertain
times, the effects of pre-Brexit ESG scores on financial perfor-
mance after the referendum are analysed. Even though the
scores as of 2015 would have been the most recent scores
available prior to the referendum, this paper relies on the
scores as of 2014. This is done to control for two antagonis-
ing effects documented in literature: Buchanan et al. (2018);
Lins et al. (2017) indicate firms might increase CSR invest-
ments as a risk management tool if adverse events are antic-
ipated. Given that the people’s vote was one of the conser-
vative party’s campaign pledges in the 2015 general election
(Wheeler, 2017), some firms might have anticipated an in-
crease in policy uncertainty. On the contrary, Julio and Yook
(2012) provide evidence for the tendency that firms reduce
investments in election years. The necessity to do so is illus-
trated by the high variance between ESG scores of 2014 and
2016. Based on these considerations, the ASSET4 universe
as of 2014 comprising 405 companies constitutes the initial
7Thomson One makes use of more than 400 different data points to
construct 178 comparable measures, from which scores for ten categories
are calculated. These categories are aggregated to form the three dimen-
sions of Environmental (categories: resource use, emissions, innovation),
Social (categories: workforce, human rights, community, product responsi-
bility), and Governance (categories: management, shareholders, CSR strat-
egy) scores (Reuters, 2019).
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Figure 1: UK News-Based Policy Uncertainty Index (data by Baker et al. (2019))
The first graph shows the development of the UK Policy Uncertainty Index since the beginning of records; the second graph shows the development for the
sample period of the data analysis. The line labelled mean shows the mean Policy Uncertainty Index since the beginning of records; the line labelled mean
-10 years shows the mean for the last ten years. The dotted line indicates the date of the Brexit Referendum.
Figure 2: Outcome of Brexit Polls Conducted in 2015 and 2016 (based on Financial Times, 2016)
sample8.
Following general convention in literature, financial
firms9 were removed. For one, due to differences in balance
sheet structure. Secondly, because Ramiah et al. (2017) and
Hill et al. (2019) found UK financial firms to be more severely
affected by Brexit, possibly due to the threat of losing their
EU bank license passport. This leaves us with an unbalanced
panel of yearly financial data for 320 firms, starting in 2014
and ending in 2018 (1,600 firm-year observations). The
financial and CSR variables used are defined below.
8The information on the universe of ASSET4’s historical constituents was
obtained from Datastream.
9Financial firms were identified using the two-digit ICB industry codes
provided by FTSE International and obtained from Datastream.
3.4. Empirical Methodology
3.4.1. Shock-Period Returns
First question of interest is the effect of CSR on stock re-
turns during the shock period. Following Lins et al. (2017),
shock-period stock returns are measured as the firm’s raw
buy-and-hold returns (BHAR). BHARs were chosen to allow
for compounding effects and thus to better capture investors’
tendency to buy and hold equities for multiple months un-
der the existence of transaction costs (Brooks, 2014; Dutta
& Jog, 2009). The holding period commences three months
prior to and liquidation of the position is three months after
the Referendum, resulting in a holding period from March
to September 2016. As illustrated in eqn. (1), BHARs are
calculated as the difference between the compounded shock-
period returns of the firm and of a benchmark. Thereby, the
UK market portfolio provided by the University of Exeter’s Xfi
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Table 1: Definition of Variables
Variable Measure
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regression
ltd_atw Long-term debt over total assets as of 31/12/2015.
dlc_atw Short-term debt over total assets as of 31/12/2015.
cash_taw Cash and short-term investments over total assets as of 31/12/2015.
sizew Natural logarithm of total assets as of 31/12/2015 to account for the highly skewed nature of this
variable.
beta_rmrfw Exposure to market risk estimated over the period between 01/2014 to 12/2015.
beta_umdw Exposure to momentum factor estimated over the period between 01/2014 to 12/2015.
beta_hmlw Exposure to value factor estimated over the period between 01/2014 to 12/2015.
beta_smbw Exposure to size factor estimated over the period between 01/2014 to 12/2015.
Panel B: DiD Model
Dependent Variables
tqw We follow Buchanan et al. (2018) and measure firm value using Tobin’s Q approximated as follows:
tqt =
at t + (chso ∗ prcc_ ft)− ceqt
at t
at is total assets, chso is common shares outstanding, prcc_f is year-end stock price, and ceq is common
equity. A value below 1 indicates a firm is undervalued; a value above 1 indicates it is overvalued.
sales_gw Sales growth defined as current annual sales divided by sales of the previous year.




cogs is cost of goods sold.
zscorew Altman (1993) Z-score. We follow Bouslah et al. (2018) and calculate as follows:

























wcap is working capital, re is retained earnings, ebit is earnings before interest and taxes, mkval is
market value of equity, and lt is book value of total liabilities. The lower the zscore, the higher the
likelihood of default.
s_cashw Financial slack which measures the cash available to finance new projects. It is calculated as:
s_casht =
oanc ft − dpct + x rdt
at t
oancf is the net cash flow from operating activities, dpc is depreciation, and xrd is R&D expenses.
roew Return on equity measured as net income in year t over total common equity in year t.
sales_pew Sales in year t over employees in year t.
roaw Return on assets measured as net income in t over total assets in t.
(Continued)
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Table 1—continued
Independent Variables
esg2014 Composite measure of CSR (ESG score) as of 2014.
envs2014 Environmental score as of 2014.
socs2014 Social score as of 2014.
es2014 Composite environmental (E) and social (S) score as of 2014.
gov2014 Corporate Governance score as of 2014.
sizew Firm size measured as natural logarithm of total assets in t.
capexpw Current capital expenditures standardised by current total assets.
fabaw Tangibility proxied by current property, plant and equipment over current total assets.
cash_taw Cash holdings measured by current cash and short-term investments over current total assets.
bleveragew Book leverage as the ratio of current long- and short-term debt to current total assets.
turnoverw We follow Ding, Ferreira, and Wongchoti (2016) and include the natural logarithm of average monthly
volume over shares outstanding at the end of each year t in models on Tobin’s Q and ROE.
rdw R&D intensity measured as current research and development expenses over current sales.
advertw Servaes and Tamayo (2013) show the effect of CSR on firm value depends on customer awareness
measured by advertising expenditures over sales. Following Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), current
selling, general and administrative expenses over current sales is used instead due to data availability.
Interaction Terms
ibresg Interaction term between the Brexit Referendum dummy (1 in 2016; zero otherwise) and esg2014.
ipostesg Interaction term between the post Brexit Referendum dummy (1 in 2017 and 2018; zero otherwise)
and esg2014.
ibres Interaction term between the Brexit Referendum dummy (1 in 2016; zero otherwise) and es2014.
ipostes Interaction term between the Brexit Referendum dummy (1 in 2017 and 2018; zero otherwise) and
es2014.
ibrcg Interaction term between the Brexit Referendum dummy (1 in 2016; zero otherwise) and gov2014.
ipostcg Interaction term between the post Brexit Referendum dummy (1 in 2017 and 2018; zero otherwise)
and gov2014.
Note: the suffix w denotes winsorization at the 1% and 99% level. To ensure a robust sample size, we follow Buchanan et
al. (2018) and set R&D equal to zero when R&D expenses are missing.

























expected return of the market portfolio at time t
The BHARs are then analysed in a cross-sectional regres-
sion to determine whether and how they are influenced by
ESG, ES, and Corporate Governance. The baseline model in-
cludes linear ESG, ES and Governance scores as continuous
variables. To control for omitted variables that happen to
be correlated with CSR measures and influencing inferences
drawn, we follow Lins et al. (2017) and include three sets of
controls. The first set is firm’s financial health. Earlier stud-
ies suggest that policy uncertainty is inversely related to cash
10http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/
xfi/famafrench/files/
holdings (inter alia, Phan et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2016) and
frim profitability (An et al., 2016) as well as positively re-
lated to costs of debt financing (Francis et al., 2014). Given
that these circumstances increase the risk of financial distress
(Cremers & Yan, 2016), one might assume that profitable
and cash-rich firms performed better during the shock pe-
riod. This effect is captured by the financial health variables.
The second effect controlled for are firm-specific character-
istics, which were found to forecast stock returns success-
fully (inter alia, Kong, Rapach, Strauss, & Zhou, 2011; Ra-
pach & Zhou, 2013). Finally, we include the Fama-French-
Carhartt (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 1993) four-factor
exposures11. To maintain a robust sample size, factor load-
ings were estimated over a period of 24 months prior to Jan-
uary 2016 (instead of 60 months as suggested by Lins et al.
(2017)). Firms for which data was only available for fewer
than 12 months to estimate the factor loadings were omit-
11The factor returns were again obtained from the Xfi Centre for Finance &
Investment. Stata commands for estimating the factor loadings are provided
in the appendix.
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ted12. This leads to the following regression setup. All con-
trol variables are defined in Table 1. We measure financial
health indicators and firm size at the end of 2015.
{cross-sectional regr.}: BHARi
= b0 + b1 ∗CSRi,2014 + b′2 ∗ X i,2015 + indust + εi t
(2)
α constant
b1 estimated effect of CSR on shop-period BHARs
CSR(i,2014) proxy for CSR (linear ESG, ES, or G score) mea-
sured at year-end 2014
b′2 vector of coefficients for the control variables
X i vector of control variables lagged by one year
indust industry fixed effects
εi t error term
Building on findings of the effect of CSR varying across in-
dustries (e.g. Jo & Na, 2012), we include industry dummies
at the two-digit ICB industry code level. This further pays
credit to findings by Hill et al. (2019); Ramiah et al. (2017);
Tielmann and Schiereck (2017) suggesting some industries
were more severely affected by the Referendum than others.
Further, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were
applied.
3.4.2. Corporate Financial Performance Surrounding the
Brexit Referendum
The DiD methodology is a shock-based research design
for causal inferences aiming at limiting selection and omitted
variable bias (Atanasov & Black, 2016, p. 216). A standard
DiD design assumes a shock separates firms into treatment
and control groups. Thereby, the treatment firms are the ones
affected by the shock, whereas the control firms remain com-
pletely unaffected (Chava & Purnanandam, 2010, p. 273).
This allows to empirically estimate the shock’s effects on the
treated; the average treatment effects for the treated firms
(ATT). They are estimated “as (after-minus-before change for
treated firms) minus (after-minus-before change for control
group)” (Atanasov & Black, 2016, p. 218):
{panel DiD} : yi t = α+ fi + gt + (δDiD ∗wi t) + εi t (3)
α constant
fi firm fixed effects
gt time fixed effects
εi t error term
δDiD empirical estimate of ATT
wi t interaction term between a treatment dummy vari-
able (1 for firms in the treatment group; 0 for firms in
the control group) and a time dummy (1 if observa-
tion is in the event window; 0 if outside of the event
window)13
12This was the case for 16 firms.
13Atanasov and Black (2016, p. 218) explain in this case the interacted
variables do not need to be included separately to estimate the interaction
term’s coefficient due to firm and time fixed effects.
In the present case, all UK firms were affected by the
Brexit Referendum, independent of their social capital pre-
viously accumulated through CSR. Rather, it is attempted to
capture a differing sensitivity to policy uncertainty of firms
based on their CSR performance. According to Lins et al.
(2017) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010), a more re-
lated research design is the DiD model with continuous treat-
ment (DiD-continuous), which will be applied in the follow-
ing analysis. DiD-continuous allows capturing the effect of
firms with differing shock sensitivity. It is posited that pol-
icy uncertainty affects firms’ performance by increasing un-
certainty among market participants about companies’ fu-
ture cash flows and financial health. Trust build-up through
CSR activities and the concept of reciprocity are hypothesised
to alleviate these uncertainties among shareholders, lenders,
and customers. Consequently, it is expected that an increase
in social capital reduces exposure to policy-induced uncer-
tainty. Thereby, ESG scores as of 2014 provided by ASSET4
are instrumentalised to impose a parametric form on the
shock sensitivity14. The latter leads to replacing the interac-
tion term wi t from eqn. (3) with an interaction between the
shock-representing time dummy and the sensitivity-to-shock
measure (Atanasov & Black, 2016, p. 253)15:
{panel DiD - continuous} : yi t
= α+ fi + gt +
 




The model setup applied in this study follows Lins et al.
(2017) in capturing effects of CSR on firm performance dur-
ing the shock period, i.e. in 2016, and after the shock period,
i.e. from 2017 to 2018. This setup allows us to scrutinise the
effects of CSR on financial firm performance in times of in-
creased and moderate policy uncertainty. In this sense, the
research design allows detecting whether effects of CSR are
unique to times of increased policy uncertainty. Figure 3 il-
lustrates how the sub-sample periods were set out. The fol-
lowing DiD-continuous model was set up:
14The theoretical considerations behind the channel through which uncer-
tainty affects firms and continuous variable to measure sensitivity are per-
ceived to be in line with Atanasov and Black (2016, p. 253) “only-through-
condition” for DiD-continuous designs.
15Atanasov and Black (2016, p. 253) explain a common variation of DiD
with a continuous sensitivity measure is to estimate a standard DiD regres-
sion using high- and low-sensitivity subsamples indicated with a treatment
dummy variable. The treatment dummy equals 1 for high and 0 for low sen-
sitivity (e.g. top vs bottom quarter or third; medium sensitivity is dropped).
This variation was not chosen due to concerns of small sample size and se-
lection bias.
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Figure 3: Construction of Sample Periods
yi t = b0 + b1 ∗CSRi,2014 ∗ Brexit+ b2 ∗CSRi,2014∗
PostBrexit+ b′3 ∗ X i,t−1 + fi + gt + εi t (5)
b0 constant
b1 Brexit-period interaction term
CSR(i,2014) proxy for CSR measured at year-end 2014
Brexit dummy variable set to one in 2016; otherwise
zero
b2 Post-Brexit-period interaction term
PostBrexit dummy variable set to one in 2017 and 2018;
otherwise zero
b′3 vector of coefficients for the control variables
X(i,t−1) vector of control variables lagged by one year
fi firm fixed effects
gt time fixed effects
εi t error term
Firm fixed effects were chosen as an econometric specifi-
cation to control for unobservable characteristics influencing
a particular firm’s financial performance (firm fixed effects).
Time-fixed effects are included to control for patterns in the
performance of all firms, which are likely to persist in times of
policy uncertainty (see, inter alia, Davies & Studnicka, 2018;
Hill et al., 2019). Both settings aim at reducing the omitted
variable bias. Additionally, standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. Thereby, a common time-series characteristic
also prevalent in panel data is controlled for: the possible
temporal serial correlation in error terms by each firm (Pe-
tersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011).
The control variables used in the models mainly corre-
spond to the ones used by Buchanan et al. (2018). Addition-
ally, we follow Ding et al. (2016) and also control for stock




In the appendix, panel A of Table 5 and Table 6 respec-
tively provide the descriptive statistics for all variables. Our
primary variables of interest are ESG, ES and Governance
scores. From Table 5, we can see that the overall ESG score in
2014, the baseline year of analysis, is rather high with a mean
of 71.6, a median of 80, and a cut-off point for the bottom
quartile of 55.68. This might indicate UK firms tend to per-
ceive CSR activities as a worthwhile investment, indicating
first support for the stakeholder view. This is further enforced
by the maximum value being close to 100 across all ESG
dimensions. Turning to individual dimensions, Governance
exibits the highest values on average, with environmental
scores being the lowest. Given that Servaes and Tamayo
(2013) argue governance to mainly address shareholder is-
sues, the higher Governance scores could be interpreted to
indicate a tilt in CSR activities towards the shareholder view.
Turning to Table 5 reveals ESG scores were not persistent dur-
ing the first half of the sample period from 2014-2016. Over-
all, ESG scores increased by 16% on average, with ES scores
even by 17%. In contrast, governance scores remained rela-
tively stable on average (0.5% increase).
Our first dependent variable to be analysed, BHARs, are
on average slightly negative, with the median (-9%) and bot-
tom quartile returns (-15.8%) being strongly negative. Nega-
tive BHARs are in line with Davies and Studnicka (2018) find-
ing significant negative abnormal returns surrounding the
Brexit Referendum. Together with the fact that the average
Z-score during the sample period is below 1.816, BHARs in-
dicate stakeholders might have been concerned about some
firms’ survival prospects. In this sense, it is not surprising
that mean and median for Tobin’s Q is below 1, suggesting
firms are on average undervalued during the sample period
(Hirschey, 1985). The latter notion is further supported by
the high gross margin and reasonable sales growth exhibited
on average.
Panel B of Table 5 and Table 6 show the pairwise corre-
lation coefficients. It is evident that for both cases, correla-
tions between independent variables to be combined in a re-
gression are below 0.65 so that no issues of multicollinearity
arise.
In terms of the correlation between the ESG pillars, it has
to be noted that there is a high (0.74), statistically signifi-
cant correlation between the environment and social score.
Hence, it can be assumed that regressions with just the en-
vironment or just the social score included in the interaction
terms will most likely capture similar effects17. Thus, CSR is
16According to Altman (1993), a score below 1.8 indicates a firm is headed
for bankruptcy. However, it has to be noted this cut-off point was estimated
in 1993.
17This anticipation was corroborated in untabulated estimations of the
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split into just two components: a composite environmental
and social (ES), and an individual governance (G) score. The
two-way separation is further justified by the moderate cor-
relation between G and both the ES score and its individual
components.
In a standard DiD design with clearly separated treat-
ment and control groups, it is further needed to defend that
the dependent variables in question follow a similar trend
for both company groups prior to the event. Thereby, the
possibility of the outcome being driven by other unobserved
factors is ruled out (Atanasov & Black, 2016). Even though
Atanasov, Black, Ciccotello, and Gyoshev (2010) and Lins et
al. (2017) do not defend this underlying assumption of DiD
in their continuous treatment setups, we still want to ensure
a common pre-treatment development prior to the Referen-
dum among firms with high and low sensitivity to the shock.
Following our hypotheses, firms with higher ESG scores are
theorised to be less sensitive. Analogous to Lambert, Noth,
and Schüwer (2017) and L. Nguyen and Wilson (2018), the
trend assumption is verified employing a graphical inspec-
tion of the dependent variables’ mean values for firms with
different shock-sensitivity over time. To do so, firms are clus-
tered into tertiles18 based on their ESG, ES and Governance
scores in 2014. Then, the bottom (theorised highest sensi-
tivity) is compared to the top (theorised lowest sensitivity)
tertile. Table 7 in the appendix reports the graphs, the ma-
jority of which support a shared pre-event trend19, further
supporting eligibility of the DiD methodology.
4.2. Regression Outcomes
4.2.1. Cross-Sectional Regression
Table 2 presents regression estimates of shock-period
buy-and-hold-returns (March to September 2016) on linear
ESG, ES, and Governance scores as well as different sets of
control variables. In models (1) to (3), only stock-market-
focused factor loadings are included; financial health and
size measures are additionally included in models (4) to (6).
Model (1) exhibits the composite CSR measure is marginally
statistically significant at 10% level and negative, providing
indicative evidence for a negative effect of previously accrued
social capital on the change in shock-period returns. The
specification of column (1), however, does not pay credit to
effects of firm-specific characteristics that were found in liter-
ature to impact firm performance during policy uncertainty.
Controlling for this (column (4)), overall CSR’s negative ef-
fect is more pronounced. Statistical significance increases
DiD-models in Table 3 with individual environmental and social scores. They
exhibited mostly identical coefficients for the interaction terms.
18Contrary to Lambert et al. (2017), we divide firms into tertiles instead
of quartiles due to the significantly lower sample size.
19For clustering by ESG, the pre-Brexit trend seems to be supported for all
dependent variables but ROE and ROA. The same goes for clustering by ES.
For Governance, it is Tobin’s Q, gross margin, financial slack, and ROA which
seem less convincing. We nevertheless perform DiD regression analysis for
these dependent variables.
to the 5% level. Economic significance rises by ca. 1.6%-
points20 given the standard deviation of 2014 ESG scores of
22.962. Hence, a one-standard-deviation increase in 2014
ESG scores causes a reduction in shock-period BHARs by
5.1%-points. Given the mean of shock-period returns of
-2.1%, this effect is economically large. Turning to the con-
trols, regression results do not support our anticipation of
firms with better financial health having superior stock per-
formance as all financial health variables are insignificant.
This is also the case for the size measure. This finding is
consistent across all models.
As for the stock-market-centered controls, CSR has a
slightly higher economic significance as market risk (4.9%-
points) under setup (4). The momentum exposure still
remains the most significant influencing factor as a one-
standard-deviation-increase leads to a reduction of BHARs
by 7.3%-points.
In the following, we disentangle CSR to see if the ES and
Governance components are evaluated differently by invest-
ing stakeholders. As for the ES pillar, respective coefficients
are again negative, but insignificant both without (2) and
with (5) controls for financial health and size. In contrast,
Governance scores are significant at the 5% level in both
setups ((3) and (6)), again with negative coefficients. The
impact of governance is also largely economically significant
with an impact of -3.54%-points and -4.11%-points respec-
tively per one-standard-deviation-increase (14.173) in pre-
Referendum Governance scores. This is further supported by
Governance having an impact on returns of more than half of
the market risk exposure (5.92%-points) without and almost
the same impact (4.35%-points) with firm characteristic and
financial health controls. Compared to the ESG factor, Gov-
ernance has a higher economic impact for a one-standard-
deviation-increase in the first model set-up, but turns out to
be of lower significance in the second setup.
Taken together, the statistical significance and economic
magnitude of ESG and Governance scores on shock-period
buy-and-hold-returns indicate accrued social capital indeed
offers important explanation for shock-period returns. Given
the insignificance of coefficients for ES scores, we infer the
effect of ESG is mainly driven by the Governance pillar. The
signs of ESG and Governance coefficients signal investors
were more concerned about firm performance when pre-
Referendum social capital reservoirs were high. One expla-
nation for this might be Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)
argument of good corporate governance restricting manage-
rial initiative. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994), for instance,
support this with their finding of powerful CEOs being able
to make quicker decisions in uncertain environments. Hence,
investors might attribute Good Corporate Governance prac-
tices to a reduced ability to withstand policy uncertainty due
to managerial restrictions. This is empirically supported by
20We follow Bouslah et al. (2018, n. 31) and measure economic signifi-
cance by multiplying the standard deviation of ESG scores as of 2014 by the
estimated coefficient associated with the linear ESG measure. For instance,
we calculated for ESG: 22.962 ∗ (−0.0022) = −0.051.
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Table 2: Shock-Period Returns and Continuous ESG Scores
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







profw -0.2541 -0.3202 -0.3112
(-0.97) (-1.17) (-1.14)
ltd_atw 0.1516 0.1719 0.1671
-1.22 -1.38 -1.35
dlc_atw -0.07 -0.0854 -0.0586
(-0.43) (-0.52) (-0.35)
cash_taw 0.204 0.2369 0.2553
-0.64 -0.73 -0.77
beta_rmrfw 0.0817*** 0.0794*** 0.0755*** 0.0625* 0.0614* 0.0555*
-2.75 -2.68 -2.69 -1.82 -1.78 -1.66
beta_umdw -0.1025*** -0.1025*** -0.1057*** -0.0860** -0.0830** -0.0858**
(-2.98) (-2.99) (-3.17) (-2.20) (-2.11) (-2.26)
beta_hmlw 0.0732*** 0.0736*** 0.0780*** 0.0602*** 0.0603*** 0.0648***
-4.03 -4.06 -4.28 -3.02 -3.02 -3.28
beta_smbw -0.0544** -0.0524* -0.0470* -0.0432 -0.0446 -0.041
(-2.00) (-1.92) (-1.83) (-1.37) (-1.41) (-1.31)
Constant 0.0861 0.0568 0.1918* -0.0143 0.0451 0.2217
-1.06 -0.72 -1.85 (-0.06) -0.19 -1.02
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 308 308 308 267 267 267
R-squared 0.331 0.326 0.332 0.361 0.354 0.362
van van Essen, Engelen, and Carney (2013) showing Gover-
nance was negatively related to firm performance during the
2008 financial crisis. Lins et al. (2017) corroborate the same
effect on stock returns.
Findings indicate investors required a risk premium for
CSR investments aggregated across CSR components and for
Good Governance additionally to a policy uncertainty risk
premium (Belo et al., 2013; Erb et al., 1996). In this sense,
our findings suggest the rejection of H10 of social capital being
positively related to shock-period stock returns while provid-
ing support in favour of H50 .
4.2.2. Difference-in-Difference Regressions
We next scrutinise whether non-investing stakeholders
hold positive beliefs about firms investing in CSR, which
translate into increased real performance on the level of
operating performance, financial health, and firm value sur-
rounding the Brexit Referendum. In the models presented
in Table 3, the variables of interest are the two interaction
terms between CSR measures and time dummies. The coef-
ficient of the interaction term “ibr” captures the differential
impact of the respective CSR measure on the scrutinised
corporate financial performance measure in the year of the
Referendum after controlling for firm characteristics and
after removing the firms’ average performance (firm fixed
effects) over the entire estimation period and after removing
time-series patterns (time-fixed effects) among the overall
financial performance measure (Lins et al., 2017). In this
sense, the coefficient of “ibr” measures marginal effects of
CSR in times of increased economic policy uncertainty. The
coefficient of “ipost” captures the equivalent effect for times
of moderated policy uncertainty.
If effects of CSR are more pronounced during increased
policy uncertainty, we should observe a significant coefficient
for “ibr” interaction terms as well as a reversal of the effect
in the post-Referendum period (Buchanan et al., 2018).
Panel A of Table 3 presents regression results regarding
the composite ESG measure. Looking at operating perfor-
mance, we first analyse distribution as an influencing chan-
nel for CSR. We thereby investigate whether customers were
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more willing to stick with a company due to previously-build,
positive beliefs about them. Here, our first model in col-
umn (1) scrutinises whether higher-CSR firms exhibit higher
changes in gross margins surrounding the Referendum. Nei-
ther interaction term shows a statistically significant coef-
ficient at 5%, indicating higher-CSR firms did not realise
higher mark-ups around the Referendum. We next turn to
sales growth (2) and again find no significant effect at 5%
in both time periods. Cognizant that there are no differ-
ences between high and low-CSR performers in 2016 and
post-Referendum, it is not surprising that we cannot detect
any significant effect of CSR on profitability during high and
moderated policy uncertainty.21 This finding holds for both
ROA (column (3)) and ROE (column (4)). Hence we can in-
fer high-CSR firms neither exhibit increased operating perfor-
mance relative to other firms during high nor during moder-
ated policy uncertainty. Our findings are in line with Nelling
and Webb (2009), but contradict Guenster et al. (2011).
Our next set of models focuses on financial health. The
first explained variable is financial slack (5), i.e. the cash
available to finance new projects. We find overall CSR per-
formance to have no significant effect on the cash cusion of
firms to withstand tough times. The model on Altman’s Z
(6) indicates ESG neither has a stabilising nor destabilising
effect on firms during or after 2016. Given the two variables
are in part derived from explained variables in the models
on operating performance, the findings are not surprising.
In sum, we cannot support Goss and Roberts (2011) finding
of reduced default risk.
Column (7) exhibits our last level of real performance:
firm value. Tobin’s Q further offers a forward-looking mar-
ket perspective. Additionally, it captures the market value
managers can generate per unit of underlying asset so that
Tobin’s Q also assesses managerial quality (Guenster et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, the market perspective is also influ-
enced by operating performance and financial health crite-
ria. In this sense, findings of insignificant interaction term
coefficients for both subsample periods are in line with the
previous model settings. In this finding, we contradict Ghoul
et al. (2017); Guenster et al. (2011); Jiao (2010); Nelling
and Webb (2009).
Among the control variables, it might be worth noting
that size exhibits highly significant negative effects at 1%
level on sales growth and operating profitability measured
by ROA, as well as financial slack over the whole sample
period. Further, firms with higher operating performance
measured by ROA and sales growth seem to exhibit higher
financial slack (5) and financial stability (6). Higher sales
growth is also significantly positively linked to higher gross
margins (1). These findings, however, apply for the whole
21We further investigate effects of ESG, ES, and Governance on the cus-
tomer channel in untabulated regressions leading to consistent fndings. We
regress accounts receivables over sales against the same explanatory vari-
ables but do not find customers of high-CSR frims to pay their accounts faster
in the year of the Referendum or after. Further, we investigate whether em-
ployees are more productive by regressing sales per employee. We again fail
to detect any significant relationship.
sample period and are but indicative findings for effects dur-
ing policy uncertainty. Nevertheless, they seem to generally
be in line with Davies and Studnicka (2018) and Hill et al.
(2019) investigations on Brexit exposure and, more gener-
ally, on impacts of policy uncertainty (inter alia, Boutchkova
et al., 2012; Gulen & Ion, 2016).
To address hypothesis number five, we reestimate the
DiD-models but interact the Brexit and PostBrexit dummies
with aggregated ES (Table 3 Panel B) and Governance scores
(Table 3 Panel C) respectively. Regarding the main variables
of interest, insignificant effects across all models and both in-
teraction terms remain persistent. Further, significance and
sign of aforementioned controls are consistent across all pan-
els. Note that the correlation between ES and Governance
scores as of 2014 is significantly below 0.65 so that consis-
tent results were not necessarily anticipated. Hence, we can-
not corroborate our previous finding of Governance having
more significant impacts on financial performance than ES.
In contrast to investors, non-investing stakeholders of UK-
listed firms did not exhibit the selective value attribution that
was found by Harjoto and Jo (2015); Jiao (2010); Kim et al.
(2014); Nelling and Webb (2009) for the US. In this sense, no
support is provided for H50 on the level of real performance;
however, we find evidence against it on the level of stock per-
formance.
In summary, the DiD models reveal two key findings.
First, the benefits of relational wealth previously created
through the sum of CSR as well as on the levels of ES and
Governance do not outweigh their costs during increased
policy uncertainty in 2016. In context with our theoretical
framework, we conclude neither the effects of the reputation-
building benefits nor overinvestment costs prevailed. More
specifically, relational wealth along distribution channels did
not have significant effects. At the same time, managers of
high-CSR firms are not indicated to have exploited incom-
plete contracts for intrinsic interests to an extent harming
real performance sourrounding the Referendum. In sum,
high-CSR firms’ real performance is neither less nor more
sensitive to Brexit-induced policy uncertainty.
The second finding is the effect consistency across the
shock and post-shock periods. Hence, we were not able to
detect a dynamic relationship between CSR varying across
times of increased and moderated economic policy uncer-
tainty. Hence, our model outputs contradict what was ini-
tially anticipated. However, this finding might be attributable
to the fact that policy uncertainty levels after the Referendum
are slightly lower, but still mostly above the overall and ten-
years mean. The reason might be that Brexit procedures are
still ongoing without any agreements on a Brexit deal be-
tween the UK and the EU. In fact, commentators perceive a
no-deal Brexit which would leave the UK without access to
the EU free-trade zone to be ever more likely (Wilson, 2019).
Hence, effects of policy uncertainty are still well persistent in
2017 and 2018 (Figure 1). With that said, the magnitude
of the reduction in policy uncertainty might not be strong
enough. Alternatively, changes in policy uncertainty might
exhibit a response lag effect in significantly changing stake-
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Table 3: Real Performance and CSR Surrounding the Brexit Referendum
Standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1 level respectively.
Panel A: Effects of Composite ESG Scores on Real Performance in the year of and after the Brexit Referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES gmw sales_gw roa_netincw roew s_cashw zscorew tq2w
ibresg 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.30) (-0.48) (-0.06) (-0.62) (-0.67) (-0.05) (0.08)
ipostesg -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0003
(-0.42) (-1.07) (-0.22) (-1.31) (0.02) (1.06) (-0.94)
lagsizew -0.0272* -0.0978*** -0.0685*** -0.0006 -0.0453*** -0.1257* -0.0005
(-1.77) (-2.91) (-4.82) (-0.33) (-5.23) (-1.69) (-0.03)
lagcapexpw 0.0637 -1.6932*** -0.2582** -0.0175 -0.0956 -1.7353*** 0.3153**
(0.48) (-5.67) (-2.01) (-1.02) (-1.05) (-2.73) (2.07)
lagfabaw 0.0390 0.1420 0.0068 0.0036 -0.0723* 0.5574 0.0320
(0.49) (0.84) (0.08) (0.19) (-1.68) (1.64) (0.36)
lagcash_taw 0.0515 -0.1543 0.0987* 0.0104 -0.0044 0.2922 0.0357
(0.87) (-0.94) (1.66) (1.29) (-0.10) (0.72) (0.43)
lagbleveragew -0.0414 0.0810 0.1147** 0.0028 -0.0471 -0.2071 0.3032***
(-0.75) (0.82) (2.45) (0.26) (-1.64) (-1.12) (5.60)
lagrdw -0.7948 -0.4914 -0.0055 0.0304 -0.0902 0.3270 -0.2107
(-1.42) (-0.58) (-0.02) (1.49) (-0.34) (0.22) (-0.63)
lagadvertisingw 0.0813 0.3491*** 0.0021 -0.0083 -0.0232 -0.1158 -0.0089
(0.74) (2.85) (0.03) (-1.11) (-0.68) (-0.47) (-0.15)
turnoverw -0.0030* -0.0033
(-1.75) (-0.28)
lagroa_netincw 0.0654 0.0819 -0.0021 0.0488** 0.5627*** -0.0810
(1.38) (0.81) (-0.38) (2.22) (2.92) (-1.44)
lagsales_gw 0.0727*** 0.0441* 0.0055 0.0327** 0.2720*** 0.0013
(3.06) (1.67) (1.18) (2.44) (3.25) (0.05)
Constant 0.8079*** 1.3767*** 0.9935*** -0.0018 0.7780*** 3.5795*** 0.4231
(3.57) (2.66) (4.69) (-0.06) (6.01) (3.22) (1.44)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,310 1,313 1,309 1,256 1,308 1,278 1,255
R-squared 0.046 0.16 0.097 0.035 0.09 0.126 0.115
Firms included 283 284 283 274 283 278 274
Panel B: Effects of Composite ES Scores on Real Performance in the year of and after the Brexit Referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES gmw sales_gw roa_netincw roew s_cashw zscorew tq2w
ibres 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0001
(0.40) (-0.68) (0.15) (-0.54) (0.09) (0.51) (0.34)
ipostes 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0020* -0.0002
(-0.05) (-0.64) (0.34) (-1.18) (0.93) (1.67) (-0.75)
lagsizew -0.0271* -0.0983*** -0.0680*** -0.0008 -0.0448*** -0.1206 -0.0012
(-1.74) (-2.89) (-4.73) (-0.39) (-5.22) (-1.65) (-0.06)
lagcapexpw 0.0645 -1.6902*** -0.2581** -0.0172 -0.0981 -1.7558*** 0.3159**
(0.49) (-5.63) (-1.99) (-1.01) (-1.08) (-2.80) (2.08)
(Continued)
O. Hohlwegler / Junior Management Science 6(1) (2021) 1-24 17
Table 3—continued
lagfabaw 0.0423 0.1513 0.0115 0.0045 -0.0666 0.5822* 0.0346
(0.52) (0.89) (0.14) (0.24) (-1.55) (1.73) (0.38)
lagcash_taw 0.0493 -0.1599 0.0955 0.0097 -0.0072 0.2640 0.0348
(0.83) (-0.96) (1.62) (1.27) (-0.16) (0.65) (0.42)
lagbleveragew -0.0423 0.0785 0.1134** 0.0025 -0.0487* -0.2181 0.3030***
(-0.76) (0.79) (2.41) (0.23) (-1.67) (-1.18) (5.61)
lagrdw -0.8118 -0.5133 -0.0183 0.0274 -0.0938 0.2748 -0.2217
(-1.43) (-0.60) (-0.07) (1.39) (-0.35) (0.19) (-0.67)
lagadvertisingw 0.0831 0.3525*** 0.0043 -0.0078 -0.0208 -0.1070 -0.0066
(0.75) (2.87) (0.06) (-1.06) (-0.61) (-0.44) (-0.11)
turnoverw -0.0030* -0.0031
(-1.73) (-0.26)
lagroa_netincw 0.0650 0.0800 -0.0021 0.0482** 0.5563*** -0.0795
(1.35) (0.79) (-0.37) (2.18) (2.90) (-1.42)
lagsales_gw 0.0732*** 0.0444* 0.0057 0.0327** 0.2704*** 0.0017
(3.02) (1.67) (1.22) (2.46) (3.24) (0.07)
Constant 0.8057*** 1.3822*** 0.9863*** 0.0003 0.7692*** 3.5070*** 0.4322
(3.53) (2.64) (4.62) (0.01) (6.00) (3.19) (1.46)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,310 1,313 1,309 1,256 1,308 1,278 1,255
R-squared 0.045 0.159 0.097 0.032 0.09 0.129 0.115
Firms included 283 284 283 274 283 278 274
Panel C: Effects of Governance Scores on Real Performance in the year of and after the Brexit Referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES gmw sales_gw roa_netincw roew s_cashw zscorew tq2w
ibrgov 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0002
(0.04) (-0.06) (-0.00) (-1.21) (-1.09) (0.51) (-0.55)
ipostgov 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0013 -0.0005
(0.30) (-1.41) (0.26) (-0.99) (-0.54) (0.86) (-1.10)
lagsizew -0.0266* -0.1015*** -0.0680*** -0.0009 -0.0459*** -0.1209 -0.0022
(-1.72) (-2.98) (-4.61) (-0.42) (-5.28) (-1.64) (-0.12)
lagcapexpw 0.0689 -1.7314*** -0.2545** -0.0193 -0.1000 -1.7010*** 0.3013**
(0.51) (-5.61) (-1.99) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-2.64) (1.97)
lagfabaw 0.0444 0.1411 0.0106 0.0049 -0.0733* 0.5501 0.0293
(0.57) (0.82) (0.12) (0.26) (-1.76) (1.61) (0.33)
lagcash_taw 0.0478 -0.1603 0.0969 0.0088 -0.0032 0.3141 0.0338
(0.79) (-0.98) (1.65) (1.18) (-0.07) (0.77) (0.40)
lagbleveragew -0.0428 0.0772 0.1142** 0.0023 -0.0461 -0.1994 0.3027***
(-0.77) (0.77) (2.43) (0.21) (-1.60) (-1.09) (5.58)
lagrdw -0.8176 -0.5071 -0.0142 0.0206 -0.0915 0.4681 -0.2370
(-1.45) (-0.59) (-0.05) (1.16) (-0.36) (0.32) (-0.72)
lagadvertisingw 0.0826 0.3518*** 0.0036 -0.0078 -0.0239 -0.1197 -0.0101
(0.75) (2.77) (0.05) (-1.06) (-0.71) (-0.48) (-0.18)
turnoverw -0.0030* -0.0036
(-1.75) (-0.30)
lagroa_netincw 0.0632 0.0855 -0.0021 0.0502** 0.5631*** -0.0803
(1.33) (0.85) (-0.38) (2.27) (2.91) (-1.43)
(Continued)
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Table 3—continued
lagsales_gw 0.0738*** 0.0442* 0.0059 0.0327** 0.2641*** 0.0034
(3.03) (1.65) (1.24) (2.48) (3.14) (0.14)
Constant 0.7994*** 1.4342*** 0.9852*** 0.0015 0.7864*** 3.5028*** 0.4491
(3.50) (2.72) (4.48) (0.05) (6.05) (3.18) (1.51)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,310 1,313 1,309 1,256 1,308 1,278 1,255
R-squared 0.045 0.161 0.097 0.031 0.09 0.124 0.115
Firms included 283 284 283 274 283 278 274
holder behaviour in a way that affects the relationship be-
tween ESG and corporate financial performance.
Further discussion in light of previous shock-based stud-
ies will be provided in section 6. In sum, both key findings





Following Lins et al. (2017), we reestimate our baseline
regressions in Table 8 in the appendix and replace the contin-
uous CSR measures by dummies indicating the top (t3) and
medium tertile (t2). The bottom tertile is captured by the
constant. We thereby evaluate whether our previous finding
of inverse effects on BHARs are more pronounced at higher
levels of ESG and Governance scores.
The robustness test reveals negative effects of higher lev-
els of pre-event social capital are robust for the Governance
pillar, but not for the composite ES and ESG levels. This indi-
cates effects of ES and ESG depend upon econometric spec-
ifications and are thus less pronounced as indicated by the
baseline model.
We also conduct a further robustness test put forth by Lins
et al. (2017) and measure CSR at different points in time to
see whether our results are driven by the point in time of mea-
suring CSR. Alternatively, we measure CSR in 2015 as an-
other pre-shock measure, and in 2016. Results are reported
in Table 9 and Table 10 in the appendix. In 2015, all vari-
ables of interest are not significant at 0.05 level; in 2016, the
ESG coefficient is only negative and significant with stock-
market-based controls, while ES is negative and significant
in both model setups. The findings contradicting the baseline
model are not surprising given the high increases in ESG, ES,
and Governance scores between 2014 and 2016, mainly for
low-tier firms. We explain this with Godfrey (2005) theory
of firms instrumentalising CSR engagement as a risk manage-
ment tool in anticipation of turbulent times (Buchanan et al.,
2018; Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009; Lins et al., 2017).
This is indicated in the descriptive statistics by low-tier cutoff-
points for ESG quadrupling. For Govenance, the increase was
even sevenfold. As low-tier firms moved closer to the aver-
age, kurtosis and negative skewness increased, further sup-
porting this indication. Further research is needed, though,
to establish a causality. Under these considerations, insignif-
icance of Governance scores might hint at increased Good
Governance efforts in times of increasing policy uncertainty
are appreciated by investors as a means of reducing agency
conflicts (Cui et al., 2018; Eccles et al., 2014; Knack & Keefer,
1997; Putnam, 1993), possibly to mitigate increased cash
flow uncertainty (Cremers & Yan, 2016). In contrast, overin-
vestment concerns arise among investors for increased com-
bined environmental and social endeavours (Surroca & Tribó,
2008). This indication, again, requires further research.
5.2. Difference-in-Difference Models
Firstly, we again reestimate basline DiD-models using
CSR measures as of 2015 and 2016. The regression results
are reported in the appendix. In summary, the variables of
interest, the two interaction terms, remain insignificant at
the 5% level. Consequently, the results mainly reinforce the
previous findings of ESG, ES, and Governance having no sig-
nificant impact on real performance on the level of operating
profitability, financial health, and overall firm value.
In a second set of untabulated robustness tests, we test for
alternative variable definitions. As for dependent variables,
we reestimate baseline DiD-models for Tobin’s Q and ROA
using the following alternative definitions:
TQ=
market value of equityt + total liabilitiest






Our main findings remain unchanged. This also holds when
reestimating all 21 baseline regressions using the market in-
stead of the book leverage. Market leverage was calculated
as follows:
ML=
long-term debtt + current liabilitiest
total asset-common equityt +market capitalisationt
(8)
The same goes for reestimating all 21 baseline regres-
sions with the natural logarithm of market capitalisation and
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revenues, respectively as alternative size measures. We can
summarise the findings from the DiD-models are robust to
alternative variable definitions.
6. Further Discussion on the Dynamic Relationship Be-
tween CSR and Corporate Financial Performance
This paper contributes to literature on the dynamic rela-
tionship between CSR and corporate financial performance
with three main findings: (1) CSR and especially Governance
are inversely related to shock-period returns, (2) high-CSR
and low-CSR firms’ real performance does not differ in terms
of sensitivity to adverse Brexit shock implications, and (3) ef-
fects of CSR on real performance do not vary alongside levels
of policy uncertainty. We now proceed to discuss our findings
in context with the three papers most closely related to our
work.
These three findings are in contrast to Bouslah et al.
(2018); Buchanan et al. (2018); Lins et al. (2017), all find-
ing effects of CSR to be more pronounced during an ad-
verse shock to markets, the 2008 financial crisis. Putting
our findings in context with these papers, we identify two
mechanisms that could contribute to the disparity.
This paper resumes as a first inference that previous find-
ings do not necessarily hold in other markets and / or for
aggregated shock events other than financial market shocks.
Buchanan et al. (2018, p. 82) already hinted at this notion.
They found firms engaging in CSR to not exhibit different
firm values on average compared to non-CSR firms imme-
diately after the financial crisis. They trace this back to in-
creases in policy uncertainty, given the substantial quantita-
tive easing rounds used by the US Federal Reserve to sta-
bilise the economy. Similarities between the uncertainty sit-
uation in the US after the financial crisis and the Referendum
are evident: in both cases, prolongued economic downturns
and long-term declines in household consumptions were ex-
pected (inter alia, Dhingra et al., 2016; Fraser of Allander
Institute, 2016; Sampson et al., 2016). The severity of the
Referendum’s threat to the economy was further illustrated
by the dramatic drop of the British Pound Sterling to US
Dollar exchange rate (Allen, Treanor, & Goodley, 2016). It
was so severe that the Bank of England reacted with lower-
ing the base interest rate from 0.5% to 0.25% two months
after the Referendum to mitigate financial pressure on the
real economy (Bank of England, 2016). Aggregated shocks
to economic policy uncertainty might be of such a structural
macroeconomic nature that effects of CSR on real perfor-
mance diminish. As for the crosssectional regression, the
horizon for returns might have been too short-sighted to cap-
ture this effect.
Opposing, Lins et al. (2017, p. 1816) detect positive ef-
fects of CSR on returns and operating performance still per-
sist in the years after the crisis from 2010 to 2013. Their find-
ing leaves us to suggest as a second inference that there is an-
other, complemental factor influencing the effect of varying
macro conditions on the relationship between CSR and firm
performance: aggregated levels of trust among stakeholders
towards firms. Aggregated trust levels in the US stayed rel-
atively low after the 2008 financial crisis, which Lins et al.
(2017) attribute to be the reason behind the lacking rever-
sal in stock return valuation premia and operating outperfor-
mance for high-CSR firms22. In contrast, overall trust levels
and especially trust in companies in the UK have reached a
new hight in 2013, marking the highest level since the 2008
financial crisis. Ever since 2013, trust levels have mostly stag-
nated according to the Edelman Trust Barometer (Daniel J
Edelman Ltd., 2018). Edelman scores for trust in businesses
range from 46 to 43 between 2016 to 2018, compared to 36
in 2008. In this sense, our findings are indicative support for
Sapienza and Zingales (2012) viewpoint that trust in com-
panies becomes more important when overall levels of trust
in markets, institutions, and corporations are low. Hence,
presented empirical findings could be seen as further indica-
tion for links between financial payoffs to social capital being
more pronounced in times of low aggregated levels of trust
as established by Guiso et al. (2008) and Lins et al. (2017).
7. Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of economic policy un-
certainty on the relationship between corporate financial
performance and CSR surrounding the 2016 Brexit Refer-
endum. The investigation focuses on the 320 non-financial
firms listed at the London Stock Exchange which are part
of the ASSET4 ESG database as of 2014. The sample pe-
riod covers the years of 2014 to 2018 with 2016 indicating
increased, and 2017 to 2018 indicating moderated policy un-
certainty. As a measure of previously accrued social capital,
ESG, ES, and G scores as of 2014 were employed. The main
results can be summarised as follows. First, we find mod-
erate empirical support for social capital previously accrued
through CSR initiatives to negatively affect buy-and-hold
shock-period returns. The negative impact is driven by the
Governance score. Effects are statistically and economically
meaningful. Results are, however, not robust to capturing
sensitivity by using tertile dummies (for ESG) or using ESG,
ES, and G scores as of 2015 and 2016.
Second, we do not find non-investing stakeholders value
relational wealth created through CSR to an extent that sig-
nificantly affects the real performance of firms during the
year of the Referendum. This holds across both levels of
CSR analysed and across operational performance, financial
health, and firm value.
Third, we do not confirm previous findings of a dynamic
relationship between CSR and corporate financial perfor-
mance across times of increased (2016) and of moderated
policy uncertainty (2017 and 2018). The last two findings
are robust to using ESG, ES, and G scores measured at alter-
native points in time.
22The Financial Trust Index indicates 11% and 12% of respondents trusted
the stock market and large corporations respectively in 2009. Responses
only changed moderately to 15% and 17% at the end of 2013 (Sapienza,
Zingales, & Jones, 2019).
O. Hohlwegler / Junior Management Science 6(1) (2021) 1-2420
We interpret that from the perspective of investing stake-
holders, the shareholder view’s overinvestment hypothesis
was supported for the Brexit period. In contrast, from the
perspective of non-investing shareholder and effects on real
performance, neither the shareholder nor the stakeholder ar-
gument outweighted the other. Consequently, social capital
reservoirs are a firm characteristic that increases stock re-
turn’s but not real performance’s sensitivity to Brexit uncer-
tainty.
In the context of the emerging literature on the time-
varying nature of CSR effects, we cannot infer that policy un-
certainty caused by Brexit is a macro condition that alters ef-
fects of social capital in a way that they are more pronounced
than during moderate policy uncertainty. This might be be-
cause CSR effects are more sensitive to rather short-lived,
market-related shocks, but less sensitive to prolonged finan-
cial frictions (Buchanan et al., 2018). This indication could
be further tested by repeating the conducted analysis once
Brexit-induced uncertainty has terminated, i.e. once the UK
has officially withdrawn from the EU and has recovered from
immediate macroeconomic effects. A second inference dis-
cussed is that macro shocks might only influence the (dis-
)equilibrium between reputation-building benefits and over-
investment costs if overall levels of trust in companies decline
(Lins et al., 2017).
However, these inferences have to be interpreted with
caution as, so far, no other study has analysed impacts of pol-
icy uncertainty shocks on the relationship between CSR and
corporate financial performance. Therefore, it is suggested to
perform further robustness tests in the form of alternative re-
search designs. One example could be the standard DiD setup
employed by Buchanan et al. (2018). Thereby, firms with
ESG scores are assigned to the treatment and firms without
to the control group. This would require to create a matched
sample to ensure covariate bias to establish DiD credibility
(Atanasov & Black, 2016). A frequently employed technique
is nearest-neighbour propensity score matching with com-
mon support (e.g. Buchanan et al., 2018; Lambert et al.,
2017; L. Nguyen & Wilson, 2018)23. When applying the
matching technique, it might also be interesting to estimate
ATTs using propensity score matching24 instead of DiD re-
gression estimation. Atanasov and Black (2016) further sug-
gest exploying shock Instrumental Variable and Regression
Discontinuity designs as additional robustness tests for DiD.
They also mention placebo tests as possible robustness tests
but suggest they are more relevant to studies on legal shocks.
Alternatively, ESG measures of different data providers
such as Bloomberg or MSCI could be used for robustness
checks.
Given that shock-based research on CSR is still emerging,
this study provides several indications for further research.
In terms of the Brexit event, it is first suggested to apply the
DiD-methodology also for stock returns. A second proposal is
23Stata code for performing nearest-neighbour propensity score matching
is provided in the appendix.
24This is done in Stata using the command teffects.
to implement a triple-differencein-difference setup in which
CSR and the time dummies further interact with either firm
size, internationalisation, maturity, or performance. Theo-
retical justification is that Davies and Studnicka (2018) and
Hill et al. (2019) find firms differing on these characteris-
tics also differ in their exposure to Brexit uncertainty. Ad-
ditionally, Chan, Watson, and Woodliff (2014) and Gamer-
schlag, Möller, and Verbeeten (2011) indicate larger firms
have higher ESG activities, whereas Hong et al. (2012) re-
port the same effect for more profitable firms.
Another interesting direction is to look at different types
of aggregated shock events, e.g. additional shocks of policy
uncertainty such as 9/11, legal shocks such as the withdrawal
of the United States form the Paris climate change agreement,
or further market shocks such as the dot-com bubble. This
would be useful to establish criteria for shocks that are likely
to influence the (dis-)equilibrium between shareholder and
stakeholder view of the firm. Related to this is the proposition
to conduct the analysis on different countries since Ghoul et
al. (2017) provide evidence for incremental value of CSR be-
ing stronger in countries with reduced market-supporting in-
stitutions.
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